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WHAT DOES OPTREX MEAN FOR THE
CUSTOMS BAR?
JOHN

B. PELLEGRINI*

The decision in United States v. Optrex America, Inc.' has caused
concern within the customs bar. This concern is well based since the
decision held that counsel's advice is always discoverable by the government
in penalty cases because the defendant's state of mind is "at issue." The
decision states:
Similarly, in cases where a client's state of mind or knowledge, such as
whether the client acted negligently, is at issue, "the attorney-client privilege
with respect to attorney-client communications,
that have bearing on that state
' 2
of mind or knowledge is impliedly waived.

Optrex was decided incorrectly unless the defendant interjected an
advice of counsel defense.
I. BACKGROUND

The government's claim in Optrex was that the importer-defendant was
negligent in classifying certain liquid crystal panels and modules at entry.3
While deposing the defendant's employees, the government inquired about
advice received from counsel as to the entered classification. Defendant's
counsel objected to the line of questioning, asserting the attorney-client
privilege. The decision is not clear as to whether the defendant raised the
advice of counsel as a defense. It appears that defendant did not raise this
defense.
The decision refers to a number of government interrogatories.
Interrogatory number forty-two asked whether defendant intended to rely
upon the advice of counsel defense. This suggests that the defendant did not
assert advice of counsel as a defense. However, the defendant did reveal that
it had consulted counsel and other customs experts.4
. Mr. Pellegrini is a partner in the New York Office of McGuireWoods
LLP.
1. No. 02-00646, 2004 Ct. Int'l. Trade LEXIS 74 (July 1, 2004).
2. Optrex Am., Inc., 2004 Ct. Int'l. Trade LEXIS at *6 (citation omitted)(citing KingFisher Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 540, 572 (2003)). The reliance on King-Fisher
Co. is questionable. In that case, the court said of the information at issue: "There is
nothing to suggest that the government is seeking to obtain the substance of any
'privileged' communications between Mr. Reichstein and his client." King-FisherCo., 58
Fed. Cl. at 572.
3. The classification of imported merchandise determines the duty or tax imposed at
importation. The importer is required to exercise reasonable care in classifying the
merchandise.
4. A recent decision in the Optrex litigation clarifies this. In United States v. Optrex
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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE INTHE CUSTOMS CONTEXT

Not all communications between counsel and clients are protected. The
attorney-client privilege protects various communications from disclosure:
1) from a client; 2) to the client's lawyer or the lawyer's agent; 3) relating to
the lawyer's rendering of legal advice; 4) made with the expectation of
confidentiality; 5) not in furtherance of a future crime or tort; and 6) where
the privilege has not been waived. 5
Although the Optrex court did not address the question of whether the
advice was privileged, it is useful to consider some of the elements of the
privilege that might be viewed differently in the customs context. The
attorney-client privilege generally does not protect the facts and
circumstances of the communication. Thus, the defendant in Optrex could
not have refused to answer questions about whether it had sought legal
advice. The privilege protects communications from the client that request
legal advice and encompasses the facts that counsel needs to provide the
advice sought.6
Although the advice customs attorneys provide to importer clients
normally qualify as privileged, there may be issues of concern. The first of
these issues is whether customs attorneys provide legal advice. The privilege
exists only when the attorney is acting as a legal advisor. Communications
from an attorney acting in another capacity, such as a consultant, are not
protected by the privilege. At first glance, this may be an issue in the
customs context. This is because an importer may exercise reasonable care
by consulting with non-attorneys. 7 Nevertheless, an importer who requests
advice from counsel on questions of classification, value, origin, etc., is
seeking legal advice. Accordingly, counsel applies legal principles to facts
in providing advice. This legal advice is protected by the privilege.
A second issue is whether the advice is rendered with the expectation
of confidentiality. Where the client intends that an otherwise privileged
communication is to be disclosed beyond the attorney-client relationship, the
privilege never attaches. For example, a client may provide information to
counsel for the purpose of filing a ruling request. That communication is not

America, Inc., No. 02-00646, 2005 Ct. Int'l. Trade Lexis 168 (December 15, 2005)
("Optrex If'), the court denied the government's motion for leave to amend the complaint
to add gross negligence and fraud counts to the original negligence count. The decision
states that defendant asserted it had exercised reasonable care by consulting counsel and
other experts. The court implicitly equates this with raising an advice-of-counsel defense.
5. THOMAS E. SPAHN, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE (2001). Mr. Spahn is a partner with

McGuireWoods, LLP. I relied heavily on this very useful publication in preparing this
paper.
6. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805-06 (Fed. Cir. 2000);

Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods. Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
7. This is not a farfetched concern. Courts have held that because preparation of tax
returns and handling tax audits may or may not be performed by counsel, communications
in connection with these activities are not privileged. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220
F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000).
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privileged.8 Consequently, there is nothing peculiar about the customs
practice that invalidates the attorney-client privilege.

III.

IMPLIED WAIVER

As noted above, the privilege may be waived and the waiver need not
be express. The most common implied waiver occurs when a party claims a
defense based upon the advice of counsel. In such cases the other party is
entitled to access to that advice. 9 Thus, had the Optrex defendant defended
against the government's claims on the basis of advice of counsel, the
government would have been entitled to discover the otherwise privileged
communication. This implied waiver should not be of great concern to
importers or their counsel since an importer-defendant will not assert an
advice-of-counsel defense unless it followed that advice.
Does an importer who shares the privileged communication with its
customs broker waive the privilege? There is substantial likelihood that it
does. The courts have held that disclosure of privileged communications to
third parties such as accountants 0 and auditors 1 operates to waive the
privilege. There are exceptions here and one could make the case that
sharing a privileged communication with a licensed customs broker does not
amount to a waiver.
The issue in Optrex is whether the communication between the
importer and counsel is discoverable when the importer-defendant in a
customs civil penalty case reveals that it consulted with counsel, but does not
advance an advice-of-counsel defense. Optrex seems to answer the question
in the affirmative. The better answer is maybe. The defendant in Optrex
revealed that it had sought legal advice with respect to the classification of
its imports. This does not waive the privilege, because the fact that one
consults counsel is not privileged.
Optrexrelies upon what is referred to as the "at issue" doctrine. Under
this doctrine, courts have held that the attorney-client privilege does not
apply where the party's state of mind, such as good faith, is "at issue." The
doctrine has come under harsh criticism from courts, including the court
12
cited to in the Optrex case: Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,Inc.

8. United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F.Supp. 2d 1196, 1204-05 (C.D. Cal 1999). Note
that the courts differ on whether drafts of documents intended to be disclosed are
privileged.
9. Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263-64 (8th Cir. 1998) (party's claim that its tax position
was reasonable because it was based on advice of counsel puts advice at issue and waives
the privilege); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3rd Cir.
1994).
10. United States ex. rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F.Supp. 1243, 1249
(D.Md. 1995).
11. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum served on Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, No. M8-85,
1997 WL 1183969 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997).
12. OptrexAm., Inc., 2004 Ct. Int'l. Trade LEXIS at *6.
Some decisions have extended the finding of a waiver of the privilege to cases in
which the client's state of mind may be in issue in the litigation. These courts have
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If the "at issue" doctrine becomes the rule in negligence cases pursuant
to section 592 of the Tariff Act,' 3 the attorney-client privilege may disappear
with respect to the advice given by counsel to importers regarding
classification, valuation, origin, etc. This may not be a problem where the
importer follows the advice, even if the government disagrees with the
advice. However, where the importer does not follow the advice, the
government's access to the4 advice undoubtedly will create difficulty for
importers and their counsel. 1
The Inference Issue
It is no surprise that the government is very interested in why a
defendant who reveals that it sought legal advice would not assert the adviceof-counsel defense. The common inference is that the importer did not
follow the advice. However, not following counsel's advice does not
necessarily mean that the importer was negligent. Until recently, the
government could have argued that refusal to disclose the legal advice
created an inference that the advice was not favorable and did not support the
importer's entered classification, valuation, origin, etc.
The government's interest in the fact that an importer sought the advice
of counsel but did not advance the advice as a defense may diminish as a
result of the federal circuit's decision in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.15 In an en banc decision, the court held
that an adverse inference that a legal opinion was or would have been
unfavorable may not be drawn when a party invokes the attorney-client
privilege. 16 This decision overrules long-standing federal circuit precedent.
Although this precedent was developed in patent infringement cases, it
clearly would have had significant influence in customs penalty cases.

allowed the opposing party discovery of confidential attorney client
communications in order to test the client's contentions. See, e.g., Buyers v.
Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436 (D.D.C 1983); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 579-80
(E.D. Wash. 1975). These decisions are of dubious validity. While the opinions
dress up their analysis with a checklist of factors, they appear to rest on a
conclusion that the information sought is relevant and should in fairness be
disclosed. Relevance is not the standard for determining whether or not evidence
should be protected from disclosure as privileged, and that remains the case even if

one might conclude the facts to be disclosed are vital, highly probative, directly
relevant or even go the heart of the issue.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. 32 F.3d at 864.
13. See The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2000) (providing that civil penalties
for violation of the customs laws are based on the actual or potential loss of revenue and
are capped at the domestic value of the merchandise (usually the wholesale price in the
United States)).

14. In Optrex I, the government's motion was based in part on the assertion that
communications from counsel were evidence of fraud, presumably because the defendant
did not follow counsel's advice.
15. 383 F.3d. 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
16. Knorr-Bremse Systeme FuerNutzfahrzeuge GmbH, 383 F.3d at 1341.
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The Scope of Disclosure
Counsel's advice is discoverable when the importer interjects an
advice-of-counsel defense or otherwise waives the privilege. When this
occurs, questions arise as to what must be turned over. The choices are to
limit the scope of the waiver to the particular communication or to extend the
scope of the waiver to include all communications on the same subject
matter, for example, the underlying legal rationale of the advice.
First, it is clear that the government will have access to the factual
information upon which the advice is based. It is the general rule that an
importer must provide all of the relevant facts to counsel. Therefore, the
facts provided to counsel, on which the advice was based, should be
available to the government. However, counsel's legal reasoning (work
product) is not, or should not be, available to the government unless it was
communicated to the client. 17 After all, the question is whether the importer
reasonably relied upon the advice, not whether the advice was reasonable."8
Counsel's legal reasoning simply is not relevant to the question of whether
the importer reasonably relied upon counsel's advice.
There is one caveat here. Reliance upon advice that is not even
colorable, such as advice that snow skis are classified as water skis, would
not be a defense to negligence.
The Response to Optrex
It is too early to know just what Optrex means for customs attorneys.
At a minimum, it is a reminder that they should take all appropriate steps to
ensure that their advice to clients will be protected. The following questions
are relevant considerations for customs attorneys:

17. See Steelecase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1200 (W.D. Mich.
1997).
By asserting advice-of-counsel as a defense to willful infringement, [the client] has
waived the attorney-client privilege that would otherwise be applicable to
communications between attorney and client concerning the subject matter, all
documents referring to counsel's opinions, and all documents in possession of [the
client] bearing upon its state of mind. The waiver does not extend to attorney work
product or documents upon which the attorney relied, unless they were somehow
disclosed to [the client].
Id. See also Kaarup v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins., Co., 436 N.W.2d 17, 21 (S.D. 1989).
"We do not believe, as some courts have held, that the defense of advice of counsel
waives the attorney/client privilege with respect to all communication between
client and counsel concerning the transaction for which counsel's advice was
sought. We find that the attorney/client privilege is waived only to the extent
necessary to reveal the advice given by an attorney that is placed in issue by the
defense of advice of counsel." (citation omitted).
Id.

18. One assumes that in such cases, the legal rationale will be asserted in arguing that
the importer's claims were correct.
reasoning changes or is refined.

The issue may be important, however, when the
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1. Do you label qualifying communications as "attorney-client
privilege?" This does not create the privilege but it does make it
much more likely that the communication will be segregated in
discovery responses and the privilege asserted. It also makes it
more likely that the client will maintain the communication in
confidence.
2. Should customs attorneys advise clients that they should not ask for
advice unless they intend to follow it?
3. Should customs attorneys inform clients that their advice may be
discoverable by the government if a penalty action is commenced?
4. Should advice be limited to laying out the relevant facts and stating
the advice without detailed legal reasoning?
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Optrex decision poses challenges to the Customs bar. Some may
read the decision as suggesting that the strength of the attorney-client
privilege in the customs context may be less robust than most of us had
Advice to clients that meets the understood
thought.
I disagree.
requirements of the privilege is entitled to protection unless the client makes
an express or implied waiver. I do not believe that there was any such
waiver in Optrex.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS: A
RESPONDENT' S PERSPECTIVE
STUART M. ROSEN, JENNIFER J. RHODES, AND

W. ANDREW RYU*

INTRODUCTION
Preliminary injunctions are fundamental to a respondent's right to
meaningful judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations by the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) and of
injury determinations by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).
Injunctions against liquidation preserve the status quo during litigation.1
Injunctions also provide the mechanism for a respondent to obtain refunds
(with interest) of cash deposits respecting antidumping or countervailing
duties required by the Department of Commerce as a result of determinations
that are deemed by the courts to be unsupported by substantial evidence or
otherwise not in accordance with the law.2 The need for this mechanism to
preserve the U.S. Court of International Trade's (CIT) jurisdiction and
meaningful judicial review stands in contrast to the statutory judicial review
and potential refund mechanism for the erroneous appraisement or collection
of normal Customs duties. The statute requires an importer to protest such
action, to exhaust administrative remedies, and to pay duties deemed owed
by Customs prior to the CIT's assertion ofjurisdiction over the matter.3

This article was prepared by Stuart M. Rosen, Jennifer J. Rhodes,
and W. Andrew
Ryu of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP for the United States Court of International Trade's

November 2004 Judicial Conference.
1. See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2004) (stating that although a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, it

is used to preserve the parties' positions until court adjudication).
2. See, e.g., id. at 1327 ("After an antidumping review determination, if a party's
entries are liquidated prior to judicial review of the determination and antidumping duties

are assessed, any outstanding challenges as to those entries are rendered moot because
liquidation, absent errors by Commerce or Customs, places the entries outside the
jurisdiction of the court."). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806,

810 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The statutory scheme has no provision permitting reliquidation in
this case or imposition of higher [or lower] dumping duties after liquidation if [plaintiff] is
successful on the merits.").
3. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1515 (2000) (setting forth the processes for protests against

Customs Service determinations and for protest review); 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) (2000) ("A
civil action contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930

[19 U.S.C. § 1515] may be commenced in the Court of International Trade only if all
liquidated duties, charges, or exactions have been paid at the time the action is
commenced....").
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THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND STANDARDS FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A.

ProvidingInjunctive Relief

The CIT has broad authority to grant injunctive relief against
liquidation and in other appropriate circumstances. For instance, section
516A(c)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(1),
provides:
Unless such liquidation is enjoined by the court under paragraph (2) of this
subsection, entries of merchandise of the character covered by a determination
of the Secretary, the administering authority, or the Commission contested
under subsection (a) shall be liquidated in accordance with the determination
of the Secretary, the administering authority, or the Commission, if they are
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or before the date
of publication in the Federal Register. . . of a notice of a decision of the United
States Court of International Trade, or of the United States Court
of Appeals
4
for the Federal Circuit, not in harmony with that determination.
Furthermore, section 516A(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2), provides:
In the case of a determination described in paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
[stating the determinations by the Secretary, the administering authority, or the
Commission subject to judicial review under this section], the United States
Court of InternationalTrade may enjoin the liquidation of some or all entries
of merchandise covered by a determination of the Secretary, the administering
authority, or the Commission, upon a request by an interested party for such
relief and a proper5 showing that the requested relief should be granted under
the circumstances.
This section works in conjunction with section 516A(e)(2) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2), which provides in
pertinent part:
If the cause of action is sustained in whole or in part by a decision of the
United States Court of International Trade or of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit - -. . . (2) entries, the liquidation of which
was enjoined under subsection (c)(2) of this section,
shall be liquidated in
6
accordance with the final court decision in the action.
Rule 65(a) of the Rules of the CIT sets forth the procedural
requirements for any preliminary injunction issued by the court, and provides
that, "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the
adverse party."7 The CIT has additional authority to grant other forms of
injunctive relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to protect its

4. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2) (emphasis added).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2) (emphasis added).
7. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 65(a)(1).
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exclusive jurisdiction, 8 or by way of its other equitable and remedial powers
under 28 U.S.C. § 2643. 9
B.

The FourFactors
In providing injunctive relief, the CIT considers the four factors
involved for such relief. The required factors are: (l)absent the requested
relief, the movant will suffer immediate irreparable harm;
(2)there exists in the movant's favor a likelihood of success; (3)the
public interest would be better served by the requested relief, and (4)the
balance of hardships on all the parties tips in favor of injunctive relief.'0
In considering whether a party established these factors, the court in its
analysis "employs a 'sliding scale,' and, consequently, need not assign to
each factor equal weight."" That said, all the factors must be met. 2 The
absence of one factor may be sufficient, given the weigh, or lack of it,
assigned to other factors, to justify the denial of injunctive relief.' 3 It is wellestablished that whether the foundation for injunctive relief was established
and whether such relief, therefore, is appropriate, are matters "largely within
the discretion of the trial court."' 4
C. IrreparableHarm
1.

The Seminal Decision: Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States

Irreparable harm is the "crucial element" for injunctive relief.'5 The
courts have long held that irreparable harm is established when there is "a
viable threat of serious harm which cannot be undone .... A preliminary
injunction will not be issued simply to prevent a mere possibility of injury,
16
even where prospective injury is great."'
8. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 556, 562 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(stating that courts are allowed to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate" pursuant to the
All Writs Act).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c) (2000) (allowing the court to "order any other form of
relief that is appropriate in a civil action"); Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355
F.3d 1297, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that the CIT is given broad remedial powers
under § 2643).
10. FMC Corp. v. United States, 3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Zenith, 710
F.2d at 809).
11. Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 186, 190 (2001) (citing FMC
Corp., 3 F.3d at 427).
12. See U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles and Apparel v. United States, 413 F.3d 1344,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing the CIT's grant of injunctive relief on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to establish the "likelihood of success prong").
13. See FMC Corp., 3 F.3d at 427 (stating that the weakness of one factor may be
overborne by the strength of another).
14. Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d
1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
15. Fuyao Glass Indus. Group Co., Ltd. v. United States, No. 02-00282, 2003 WL
22058668, at *3 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 2, 2003).
16. S.J. Stiles Assoc. Ltd. v. Synder, 646 F.2d 522, 524 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (rejecting
Customs brokers' application for a preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of
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On this basis, the Federal Circuit rendered its seminal decision in
Zenith, with respect to the establishment of irreparable harm in cases seeking
to enjoin the liquidation of entries and the assessment of antidumping and/or
countervailing duties in connection with a challenge to an annual review
determination.' 7 There, the court concluded that because liquidation would
eliminate the only remedy available to the plaintiff-petitioner for an incorrect
annual review determination, liquidation of entries would constitute
irreparable harm, as not only would the plaintiff be harmed economically,
but it would be denied the right to obtain meaningful judicial review.'8
The CIT repeatedly applied Zenith and granted injunctions in cases
where the movant asked for it, pending the outcome of the court's review of
Commerce's findings in an underlying administrative review proceeding.
This decision was based upon the ground that liquidation would permanently
deprive the movant of its meaningful judicial review of Commerce's findings
- "the inability of the reviewing court to 'meaningfully
correct the review
9
injury."'
irreparable
constitutes
determination'
2.

Extending Zenith

The CIT extended Zenith to other situations where a movant would be
deprived of meaningful judicial review. For example, a preliminary
injunction was available to enjoin the automatic assessment and liquidation
of duties when an importer challenged an original antidumping order, but did
not request an administrative review of the same. 20 A preliminary injunction
was also available when an importer challenged the continuation of an
21
antidumping or countervailing duty order pursuant to an ITC sunset review.
The CIT, however, generally did not extend Zenith beyond its facts to
satisfy the irreparable harm factor without additional evidence, which it often
found lacking. For example, when a case involved an appeal of an
investigation determination,. rather than an administrative review
determination, the CIT sometimes did not find irreparable harm. 22 Basically,
a Customs directive due to their failure to establish irreparable harm).
17. Zenith, 710 F.2dat810.
18. Id.
19. SKF USA, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (citingZenith, 710 F.2dat 811).
20. See OKI Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 624, 631 (1987)
(finding liquidation and automatic assessment to cause irreparable harm, not only because
of economic loss, but additionally by deprivation of meaningful judicial review). See also
Fuyao Glass, 2003 WL 22058668, at *3 (holding that an exporter, who withdrew its
request for administrative review, was entitled to a preliminary injunction against
liquidation to preserve exporter's challenge to the underlying antidumping duty order).
Compare Cambridge Lee Indus. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 847, 847 (1989)
(finding that a preliminary injunction was not available when the party seeking injunctive
relief did not join the request for administrative review).
21. See Ugine-Savoie Imphy v. United States, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 1246, 1249-51 (2000)
(finding irreparable harm in a sunset review appeal (citing NMB Sing. Ltd. v. United
States, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 1239 (2000))).
22. See Ahx, Inc. v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002)
(citing Trent Tube Div., Crucible Materials Corp. v. United States, 14 Ct. Int'l Trade 587,
588 (1990) (holding that "additional evidence" must be shown by plaintiff- petitioners, as
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the court held that "[u]nlike an annual review, a negative injury
determination affects liquidation of all future entries, not just those made
within a specific time period. In such a situation, liquidation does not
substantially curtail available judicial remedies., 23 Thus, "in cases involving
negative injury determinations, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must
submit actual evidence of irreparable harm rather than relying on the mere
fact of liquidation. 24
In Altx, Inc, v. United States, the CIT denied injunctive relief to
domestic manufacturers, rejecting the argument that the liquidation of entries
coupled with the "loss of duty revenue under the Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act ("CDO") constitute[d] irreparable harm."25 The CIT
held that the plaintiffs assertions about lost revenue under the CDO were
speculative given the evidence presented.2 6 To carry its burden to establish
irreparable harm, the CIT stated: "Altx must produce affidavits or other
evidence showing, with more specificity, expected lost antidumping duties
on liquidated entries, the amount of antidumping duties to be raised in the
event of the issuance of an antidumping duty order, and the amount
of
27
qualified expenditures [under CDO] to be expected following an order."
The CIT was hesitant to grant a preliminary injunction in cases
involving requests for injunctive relief against government acts other than
liquidation. 2t In Shandong Huarong General Group Corp. v. United States,
the exporter-plaintiff argued, under Zenith, that it would suffer irreparable
harm if forced to post cash deposits on entries at the new, higher rate
determined by Commerce, as it would be "forced out of business" and
thereby lose its ability to obtain meaningful judicial review.2 9 The CIT
rejected the plaintiffs argument, finding that the plaintiffs sole reliance on
an affidavit from a "major" customer, which stated that if forced to pay cash
deposits it would be unable to continue importing, was insufficient to show
irreparable harm when the plaintiff failed to produce additional evidence
showing how these sales would impact its overall financial position, the lack
of cash reserves, the lack of viable alternative markets, and the lack of sales
of non-subject merchandise. 30 Additionally, the CIT stated as a general
matter that affidavits submitted by interested parties were weak evidence of

liquidation of entries without duties is not per se irreparable harm in the context of
investigation determinations) (emphasis in original).
23. Sandoz Chems. Corp. v. United States, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 1061, 1063 (1993).
24. Id.

25. Alix, 211 F.Supp. 2d at 1381.
26. Id.at 1381-82.

27. Id. at 1381.
28. See, e.g., Corus Group PLC v. Bush, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1359 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2002) (rejecting plaintiff-respondent's motion for injunctive relief to enjoin Customs from
collecting additional duties in accordance with presidential proclamation); Shandong
Huarong Gen. Group Corp. v. United States, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 1279, 1285 (2000)
(rejecting injunctive relief on the basis of no finding of irreparable harm when plaintiff
requested an "injunction against collection of new rate pending judicial review").
29. Shandong, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade at 1282.
30. Id. at 1282-85.
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irreparable harm, and that what was needed was independent evidence
showing exactly how these lost sales would force it out of business. 3'
Preliminary injunctions may not be available when cases involve
liquidations unlikely to occur prior to the issuance of the CIT's decision on
the merits. 32 In Corus Group PLC v. Bush, a foreign producer-plaintiff
argued that it would suffer irreparable harm because the collection of
additional duties on its entries and/or the liquidation of such entries would
close one of its plants and have a "significant and irreversible adverse impact
upon its business operations., 33 The CIT rejected this argument, finding
that: (1) although the plaintiffs showed evidence of serious economic
hardship as a result of the collection of additional duties, finding irreparable
harm would create a per se rule given the vast number of importers affected
by the additional duties with similar challenges; and (2) because the court
was likely to resolve the merits of the case prior to the liquidation of the
plaintiffs' entries, which can generally take up to a 34
year from entry, harm
unlikely.
be
would
Zenith
in
noted
as
from liquidation
Further, even if Zenith and its progeny are applicable and irreparable
harm is established by lack of meaningful judicial review or other sufficient
evidence of harm, the courts have held that injunctive relief may not be
granted absent at least a minimal showing of the other factors required for
injunctive relief 35 That said, of course, to the extent the court finds no
irreparable harm, the court need not reach the other three factors.3 6
D. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The CIT stated that once irreparable harm is established, "it will
ordinarily be sufficient that the movant has raised questions which are
'serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful."' 3 7 In addition, "[t]he greater the
potential harm to the plaintiff, the lesser the burden on [p]laintiffs to make
the required showing of likelihood of success on the merits. 3 8
Although establishing the likelihood of success is a lesser burden, the
courts have rejected injunctive relief where the plaintiff failed to establish
this factor. For example, in FMC Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
31. Id.at 1283 (citing Shree Rama Enters. v. United States, 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1165,
1167 (1995); Companhia Brasileira Carbureto de Calcio v. United States, 18 Ct. Int'l
Trade 215, 217 (1994)).
32. See Corus, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (rejecting injunctive relief to enjoin Customs
from collecting additional duties on liquidation entries in accordance with presidential
proclamation).
33. Id. at 1354.
34. Id. at 1355-56.
35. See FMC Corp., 3 F.3d at 430 (stating that "[n]owhere in Zenith does it suggest
that the harm suffered by FMC entitles FMC to an injunction absent a showing of
likelihood of success on the merits").
36. Altx, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1382.
37. Timken Co. v. United States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 76, 80 (1983) (quoting County of
Alameda v. Weinberger, 520 F.2d 344, 349 n. 12 (9th. Cir. 1975)). See also Ugine-Savoie
Imphy, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade at 1252 (noting that Plaintiffs "are required only to raise 'serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful' questions") (citations omitted).
38. SKF USA,316 F. Supp. 2d. at 1329.
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found that the appellants-petitioners failed to establish the likelihood of
success on the merits, as FMC's claims on their faces did not seriously
challenge the legality or reasonableness of Commerce's determination. 39 In
NSK Ltd. v. United States, the CIT denied a request for injunctive relief
where the relief requested by the plaintiffs-respondents' substantive claims
would force Commerce to act in a manner contrary to the law.40
E. Balance of the Hardships
"An inquiry into the balance of hardships requires [the] court to
determine which party will suffer the greatest adverse effects as a result of
the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction." ' In the context of Zenith,
generally the courts found the balance to favor the party seeking injunction.
The courts held that the balance of hardships favors an injunction in most
instances because "[t]he Government will, in fact, ultimately collect or
refund, with interest, any amounts owed from or due to [the Government] at
the conclusion of this litigation.""2
In Corus, the CIT considered the impact of the imposition of Section
201 duties, and finding no irreparable harm, denied injunctive relief.43 Even
so, the CIT held that while the domestic industry suffered some hardship
associated with increased low-priced imports, the balance of hardships
favored the foreign producer, Corus, which demonstrated that the imposition
of additional duties would result in substantial harm.4 4 As stated above,
the irreparable economic harm required
however, this harm did not constitute
45
for the grant of injunctive relief.
F. Public Interest
"It is well settled that the public interest is served by 'ensuring that the
ITA complies with the law, and interprets and applies [the] international
trade statutes uniformly and fairly.' 4 6 In the context of Zenith, the court
deemed this factor satisfied, as the public interest is best served by assuring
that parties can obtain effective judicial review. 47 Further, in SKF USA Inc.
v. United States, the court held that "the public interest may be best
maintained by 'the procedural safeguard of an injunction pendente lite to
maintain the status quo of the unliquidated entries until a final resolution on
39. FMC Corp., 3 F.3d at 427-30.
40. NSK Ltd. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131-32 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
See id. (requesting that the Department change its model matching methodology prior to
considering all the data and allowing interested parties to comment).
41. Ugine-Savoie Imphy, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade at 1250.
42. SKF USA, 316 F. Supp. 2dat 1328.
43. Corus, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1354-56.
44. Id. at 1357.
45. Id.
46. Ugine-SavoieImphy, 24 Ct Int'l Trade at 1252 (citing PPG Indus. v. United States,
II Ct. Int'l Trade 5, 9 (1987)) (quoting Ceramica Regiomontana v. United States, 7 Ct.
Int'l Trade 390, 397 (1984)).
47. See SKF USA, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1329 (stating that the public interest may best be
served by an injunction that would maintain the "status quo" of the unliquidated entries).
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the merits,"' and that "granting Plaintiffs motion for preliminary
injunction.. will further
the public interest of an accurate assessment of
8
duties.'
antidumping
II.

THE DURATION OF CIT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A.

Dissolution of PreliminaryInjunctions

A CIT preliminary injunction issued under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2)
dissolves upon a "final court decision" after the appeals process. 49 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(e)(2), in pertinent part, provides:
If the cause of action is sustained in whole or in part by a decision of the
United States Court of International Trade or of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit - -. . . (2) entries, the liquidation of which
was enjoined under subsection (c)(2) [the preliminary injunction subsection],
50
shall be liquidated in accordance with the final court decision in the action.
Further, it is well-settled under Timken Co. v. United States, that under
section 1516a(e)(2), a decision that is appealable from the CIT is not a "final
court decision" for purposes of liquidation under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2) 1
B.

CIT's Authority to Issue PreliminaryInjunctions Challengedby
Government
Despite the Federal Circuit's holding in Timken, the government
challenged the authority of the CIT to issue a preliminary injunction, which
extends until the issuance of a "final court decision," in appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.5 2 In Yancheng Baolong
BiochemicalProducts Co., Ltd. v. United States,53 the government contended
that when "the CIT renders an opinion that is 'not in harmony' with the
agency's original determination, 'it is necessary to suspend liquidation until
there is a conclusive decision in the action,"' as defined by Timken. 54 The
government asserted that "this type of automatic injunction following a CIT
decision that is 'not in harmony' with the agency's original determination is
referred to as a 'Timken-injunction,"' and such an injunction "continues to
suspend liquidation throughout the appeals process. ' 55 However, the
Government further contended that "if the CIT issues a decision that is 'in
harmony' with the agency's original determination.., any preliminary
48. Id. (quoting Smith-Corona Group v. United States, I Ct. Int'l Trade 89, 98 (1980))
(emphasis added).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2).
50. Id.

51. SKFUSA,316F. Supp.2dat 1330.
52. Yancheng Baolong Biochemical Prods. Co. v. United States, 406 F.3d 1377, 1379

(Fed. Cir. 2005).
53. Yancheng Baolong Biochemical Prods. Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349

(Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), aff'd, 406 F.3d 1377.
54. Id.at 1353 (citing Timken Co. v. United States, 893 F.2d 337, 341 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
55. Id. at 1354.
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injunction issued by the CIT dissolves," absent the application for a "new
injunction pending appeal. 56 The Government made additional arguments
not discussed here.57
The CIT rejected the Government's argument, finding, consistent with
the Federal Circuit's ruling in Timken, that to give full effect to § 15 16a(e),
liquidation must remain suspended under a preliminary injunction issued
pursuant to § 15 16a(c)(2) until the parties exhaust their appeals. 58 Further,
the CIT noted that "[d]issolving the preliminary injunction after an 'in
harmony' CIT decision would allow liquidation to occur immediately,
possibly depriving the Federal Circuit of jurisdiction," as it no longer has
jurisdiction after the entries are liquidated.59
C. Government's Argument Rejected
The courts previously addressed this issue and largely rejected the
Government's argument that CIT-issued preliminary injunctions dissolve
upon a final decision by the CIT. In Fujitsu General America, Inc. v. United
States,60 the Federal Circuit found that a preliminary injunction against
liquidation issued by the CIT dissolved when "the time for petitioning the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari expired," or in other words, when the
decision could no longer be appealed.6 '
Also, the CIT held in SKF USA that "[o]nly after a conclusive decision
by either this or a court of appeals must a preliminary injunction be
dissolved. 6 2 In support of its argument on appeal, the Government pointed
to the Federal Circuit's decision in Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States,
which quoted Moore's Federal Practice for the proposition that "[a
56. See id. (finding the Government in contempt for liquidating entries in violation of a
preliminary injunction after the Court entered judgment, as the injunction remained in
effect pending the appeals process).
57. See id. at 1352-56 (discussing the Government's unsuccessful arguments to
distinguish prior federal circuit decisions).
58. See id. at 1358 (citing Timken, 893 F.2d at 339-40) (finding that "§ 1516a(e) does
not require liquidation in accordance with an appealed CIT decision," as "[a]n 'action'
does not end when one court renders a decision, but continues through the appeal
process").
59. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Zenith, 710 F.2d at 810).
60. Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
61. Id.
[W]e see no reason not to extend the logic of Timken to the question before us ....
Thus, there is not a "final court decision" in an action that originates in the Court of
International Trade and in which there is an appeal to the Federal Circuit until ...
the time for petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari expires without the filing
of a petition.
Id. (citing Timken, 893 F.2d at 340). See also Hosiden Corp. v. Advanced Display Mfrs.
of Am., 85 F.3d 589, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding, consistent with Timken, that
§ 1516a(e) "requires that liquidation, once enjoined, remains suspended until there is a
'conclusive court decision which decides the matter"').
62. SKF USA, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. See also Pam S.P.A. v. United States, 347 F.
Supp. 2d 1362, 1369-70 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (citing Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1379 and
Yancheng, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1349) (stating that a preliminary injunction does not persist
through appeal).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:29

preliminary injunction] is ipso facto dissolved by a dismissal of the
complaint or the entry of a final decree in the cause., 63 According to the
Government, this quote articulated a general rule that preliminary injunctions
dissolve when the CIT enters judgment on the merits. The CIT, in Yancheng
and SKF USA, rejected the Government's reasoning, finding Fundicao Tupy
distinguishable on the merits, as the court there lacked jurisdiction to issue a
preliminary injunction because the controversy was rendered moot on the
merits, and also finding that nothing in that case stood for the proposition
that all preliminary injunctions issued by the CIT
dissolve upon the issuance
64
of a judgment before the time to appeal has run.
On May 11, 2004, the Federal Circuit rendered its decision in
Yancheng, ruling that its prior precedent, including Timken and Hosiden
Corp. v. Advanced Display Manufacturers of America, "forecloses any
argument by the government that the preliminary injunction... was not
intended to persist through the appeals process." 65 Thus, it is now clear that
preliminary injunctions issued by the CIT extend until the issuance of a
"final court decision" in appeals at the Federal Circuit and until the time for
appeal to the Supreme Court has expired.
II. VIOLATIONS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
A. The Government Is Accountablefor Violations of CIT Preliminary
Injunctions
1. Liquidations in Contravention of PreliminaryInjunctions Should be
Given No Legal Effect
When an entry is liquidated in violation of a preliminary injunction,
such liquidation should be "void ab initio' 66 In AK Steel Corp. v. United
States, Customs liquidated entries in contravention of the CIT's preliminary
injunction. 67 Despite its conduct, however, the Government asserted the
liquidations to be final, as the importer failed to protest the liquidations
within the ninety-day protest period.6 8 After hearing arguments, the CIT
found that it "'possesses all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred
by statute upon, a district court of the United States,"' and thus, the illegal
liquidation of entries, contrary to the CIT's preliminary injunctions, were

63. Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 841 F.2d 1101, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
64. Yancheng, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1360; SKF USA, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
65. Yancheng, 406 F.3d at 1382.
66. See AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2003) (finding that improper liquidations by Customs did not meet the "doctrine of
finality," rendering them void from the beginning); Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United
States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1170 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (holding that liquidations
violating a court order are void ab initio). See also LG Elecs. USA, Inc. v. United States,
21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1421, 1429 (1997) (finding that liquidations that occur in violation of a
court order have "no legal effect").
67. AK Steel Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.
68, Id. at 1321.

20051

Preliminary Injunctions: A Respondent's Perspective

null and void. 69 Further, with respect to the government's claim that the
ninety-day protest period expired with respect to certain entries, the court
found that "[w]here liquidation occurs through an illegal act of Customs and
in the absence of a protestable event, the doctrine of finality cannot be said to
attach."7 ° Similarly, in Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States,
the CIT
71
initio.
ab
void
be
to
injunction
an
of
face
the
in
found liquidations
2.

Reliquidationas an Alternative

Alternatively, the CIT should order liquidated entries in violation of a
preliminary injunction reliquidated in accordance with the "final court
decision" per section 1516a(e). In EurodifS.A. v. UnitedStates, although the
CIT declined to declare liquidated entries "void," the court ordered that the
two entries should be "reliquidate[d] ... upon determination of the final and
conclusive rate of duty in accordance with the court's injunction of June 25,
2002," and thereby ensured that the entries would be ultimately liquidated at
the correct antidumping and countervailing duty rates as determined by the
courts. 72 In addition, in Eurodif, the CIT prohibited Customs from
distributing any funds from the illegal liquidations pursuant to the Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a), and required
Customs to monitor its compliance with the court's injunctions in the
affected cases.
3. Importers Should Not Bear the Burden of Remedying the Government's
Conduct
In all of the cases cited above, the CIT squarely rejected the
Government's attempt to force the importers to participate in additional
administrative proceedings, e.g., the filing of a protest or section 1520(c)
petition, as the appropriate remedy for Custom's illegal action. In LG
Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, the CIT explained:
An importer is entitled to rely on a preliminary injunction.., barring
liquidation, obtained in an effort to resolve a dispute with Customs or
Commerce. The importer's ordinary obligation to watch for notices of
liquidation is suspended where the court has issued an order forbidding
liquidation. This rule permits an importer to place trust in the judicial review
process and to turn full attention to the judicial resolution of the dispute at
hand. An agency cannot insist that an importer follow its administrative
procedure when the agency's only action violates an injunction the importer
73
obtained against that procedure in the course of a dispute with the agency.
Indeed, in AK Steel, the court reasoned that the "[Government's] claim
for an unqualified right to commit an admittedly illegal act and then invoke a
69. Id. at 1323 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (2000)).
70. Id. at 1322.
71. Allegheny Bradford,342 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
72. Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1290-91 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004).
73. LG Elecs., 21 Ct. Int'l Trade at 1428 (finding that liquidations that occur in
violation of a court order have "no legal effect").
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statute to assert immunity in such illegality is breathtaking for its
chutzpah. 7 4 Likewise, in Allegheny Bradford, the CIT was even more
forceful, stating that liquidation in contravention of a court order "creates a
whole different ball game apart from the standard protest and judicial review
framework provided by Congress., 75 According to the CIT, "'[tihe proper
means to enforce an order of this Court against the Government is to seek
relief in this Court; it is not to file a protest with Customs."' 7 6 Finally, in

Eurodif,the CIT gave weight to the importers' claims that the administrative
proceedings suggested by the Government as remedies for the erroneous
liquidations would only subject the importer to further harm and uncertainty
with respect to the liquidated entries and provide little comfort that the
entries would ultimately be appropriately liquidated. 7
4.

Importers Must Protect Their Rights

Notwithstanding the CIT's recent decisions remedying liquidations in
violation of the court's preliminary injunctions, importers should protect
their rights and avail themselves of all of the administrative procedures
available to them for redress of the erroneous liquidations, i.e., filing of
protests against liquidation within the ninety-day protest period and/or 1520c
petitions, as appropriate. These measures provide importers with protection
in the absence of court action.
IV. DEEMED LIQUIDATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
AGAINST LIQUIDATION
A.

Deemed LiquidationRegardingEntriesfor Which Liquidation is
Enjoined by CIT PreliminaryInjunction

1. Removal of the Suspension of Liquidation
Section 504(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), which
governs the deemed liquidation of entries whose liquidation previously was
suspended by court order, provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in section [1675(a)(3) of this title], when a suspension [of
liquidation] required by statute or court order is removed, the Customs Service
shall liquidate the entry... within 6 months after receiving notice of the
removal from the Department of Commerce, other agency, or a court with
jurisdiction over the entry. Any entry... not liquidated by the Customs
Service within 6 months after receiving such notice shall be treated as having

74. AK Steel Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
75. Allegheny Bradford, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.

76. Id. at 1170 (quoting Yancheng, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1364).
77. See Eurodif,306 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (noting that the government did not comply
with previous injunctions and prompting the court to require monitoring of compliance in
the future).
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been liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted
78
at the time of entry by the importer of record ....

Section 1675(a)(3)(B) provides, in pertinent part:
If the administering authority orders any liquidation of entries pursuant to a
review.., such liquidation shall be made promptly and, to the greatest extent
practicable, within 90 days after the instructions to Customs are issued. In any

case in which liquidation has not occurred within that 90-day period, the
Secretary of the Treasury
shall, upon the request of the affected party, provide
79
an explanation thereof.

The CIT interpreted section 1504(d) to require the following for entries
to be deemed liquidated: "(1)the suspension of liquidation that was in place
must have been removed; (2)Customs must have received notice of the
removal of the suspension; and
(3)Customs must not liquidate the entry at issue within six months of
receiving such notice. 80
As discussed above, the suspension of liquidation resulting from a CIT
preliminary injunction is removed when the time limit allowed for applying
for a writ of certiorari for review in the U.S. Supreme Court expires, or in
other words, after the appeals process is exhausted. 8' Otherwise, the entries
may not be deemed liquidated.
2.

Notice Required by Section 1504(d)

Notice of the removal of the suspension of liquidation pursuant to a
CIT preliminary injunction should be unambiguous and public, and may be
appropriately provided when Commerce or another agency publishes notice
of the removal of the suspension of liquidation in the Federal Register or
other public forum.82 In NEC Solutions (America), Inc. v. United States, the
Federal Circuit found notice of the removal of liquidation in the form of a
publicly posted email from Commerce to Customs, which stated that "there
should be no unliquidated entries," to be sufficiently unambiguous and
public, and rejected arguments that sufficient notice must include "explicit
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(B) (2000).
80. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1376 (finding no deemed liquidation because the entries
were liquidated within six months of the receipt of notice).
81. Id. at 1379 (citing Timken, 893 F.2d 337). See also Yancheng, 406 F.3d at 1382
(discussing the requirement of a "final court decision"); Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384
F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that "the suspension of liquidation under 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2) cannot be removed until the time for petitioning the Supreme Court
for certiorari expires").
82. See Am. Int'l Chem., Inc. v. United States, No. 02-00624, 2005 WL 1606318, at
*10 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 7, 2005) (citing NEC Solutions (Am.), Inc. v. United States, 411
F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding an email from Commerce to Customs that was
posted on Customs' publicly available Electronic Bulletin Board sufficient notice of under
Section 1504(d)); Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381 (citing Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281
F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that Commerce's publication of the final results
of administrative review in the Federal Register constituted notice to Customs within the
meaning of Section 1504(d)).
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instructions to liquidate or use particular language in order to provide notice
that the removal of suspension
has occurred" or "inform[] Customs of the
83
rate.
duty
applicable
In Fujitsu, the Federal Circuit specifically found that a court clerk's
notice to the Department of Justice or Fujitsu, or the availability of the
court's decision in the general media, did not constitute the notice required
by the statute. 4 Likewise, in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit reiterated its position that the notice to Customs required by section
1504(d) must be "unambiguous and public" to trigger the six-month
liquidation period. 85 There, the court found that a non-public e-mail
instructing Customs to liquidate certain previously suspended entries was
ineffective under the statute. 86 Accordingly, the entries were not deemed
liquidated. The lack of notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation,
however, did not alter the fact that the preliminary injunction issued by the
CIT as part of the underlying litigation dissolved upon the final court
decision. Therefore, liquidations
which did in fact occur were not violative
87
injunction.
preliminary
of a
3.

Six-Month Time Limitation Imposed by Section 1504(d)

To be deemed liquidated, entries must not be liquidated within six
months of Commerce's notice to Customs that the suspension of liquidation
was removed. 88 In InternationalTrading Co. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit held that this provision applies to "any entry," including "entries
suspended on account of an administrative review (the class of entries to
which the proviso in the first sentence of section 1504(d) referring to section
1675(a)(3) applies)."8 9 The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that entries
falling under section 1675(a)(3)(B), which requires Customs to liquidate
such entries "promptly and, to the greatest extent practicable, within 90 days
after the instructions are issued," are not subject to the six-month time limit
imposed by section 1504(d). 90
Under the specific facts of Fujitsu, the Federal Circuit addressed the
circumstance of when the agency violates its statutory obligation under 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2), to publish notice of a final court decision "within ten
days from the date of the issuance of the court decision. ' 91 There,
Commerce published notice of the court decision over one year later.92 The
83. NEC Solutions, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
84. Fujitsu,283 F.3d at 1379-80.
85. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1324 n. 13 (noting that liquidations in violation of an injunctive order are
distinguishable from the situation in Cemex and would escape the finality doctrine).
88. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(holding that the entry was deemed liquidated because Customs failed to liquidate within

six months of Commerce's notice).
89. Id. at 1312.
90. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(B)).
91. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1377 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2)).
92. Id. at 1369.
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Federal Circuit held, however, that while "frustrating," Commerce's delay
did not affect the "unambiguous and public starting point for the six-month
liquidation period," i.e., publication in the Federal Register.93 The court held
that the ten-day rule was independent of the issue of determining the date
upon which Customs received notice, or in other words, "[s]ection 1504(d)
and 1516a(e) are separate statutes. 9 4 The court reasoned that, "[sjection
1504(d) governs deemed liquidation," which under that section, "can occur
only if Customs fails to liquidate entries within six months of having
received notice of the removal of a suspension of liquidation." 9 5 The court
further noted that, "there is no language in section 1516a(e) that attaches a
consequence to a failure by Commerce to meet the ten-day publication
requirement, let alone the consequence of deemed liquidation under section
1504(d). 96
CONCLUSION
Preliminary injunctions are essential for respondents to receive the full
measure of judicial review guaranteed under the statute. As shown,
however, injunctive relief is neither automatically granted by the CIT nor
carefully implemented and monitored by the government in some instances.
The bottom line is that respondents must (1) aggressively seek injunctive
relief to protect their refund of erroneously imposed cash deposits and/or
antidumping or countervailing duties and, once granted, (2) vigilantly guard
the protection against improper liquidation afforded by injunctive relief.

93. Id. at 1381-82.

94. Id. at 1382.
95. Id.
96. Id.

